Abstract: This study documents that earnings announcements serve as a reality check on shortterm, fear and greed driven price development: stocks with extreme abnormal returns in the week before an earnings announcement experience strong price reversal around the announcement. A trading strategy that exploits this reversal is profitable in 40 of the last 42 years and earns abnormal returns in excess of 1.3% over a two day-window.
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"Be fearful when others are greedy and greedy when others are fearful" -Warren Buffett
Fear and greed are deeply ingrained in life, and are fundamental attributes to the survival of man. Without the right dose of fear, we would expose ourselves to unreasonable threats, and without the right dose of greed, we would forego opportunities to secure the resources that we need to live. However, too much of either fear or greed is often harmful. An individual overcome by fear, for example, will not be able to pursue opportunities that will help him secure the resources he needs; and an individual overcome by greed will not recognize and avoid the threats to his existence. In other words, for optimum survival, fear and greed need to be "balanced."
In financial markets, where prices are set by the interactions of thousands of individuals, "greed" for profits and "fear" of losses drive investors to make value assessments as carefully as possible, thus contributing to market efficiency. But, in this setting also, excessive or unbalanced fear or greed can be harmful. Warren Buffett's quote above succinctly speaks to the dual nature of fear and greed in investing. In a market with too many greedy or fearful investors, aggressive buying or selling may cause an overreaction, at which point it is profitable to take a contrarian position. Many investors understand this, and the history of markets has countless examples of asset prices becoming irrationally high or low because of greed and fear. The challenge in trying to profit from this mispricing, of course, lies in timing. That is, it is unclear when the market will "come to its senses" and prices will revert to levels justified by fundamentals. It is difficult, therefore, to profitably implement Warren Buffett's advice, especially in the short-term. 1 1 Buffett's advice is clearly intended as an investment strategy for the long-term; not the short-term. However, the reality is that most investors face powerful short-term performance pressures. For example, Stan Druckenmiller, the lead money manager at George Soros' Quantum Fund, closed all of his long positions in dot-com stocks in February of 2000 based on the (correct) belief that dot-com prices reflected a bubble. Weeks later, however, after prices had continued their run-up and his performance was significantly lagging that of his colleagues, Druckenmiller reclaimed those long positions. A few weeks later, the bubble burst.
In this study, we develop a trading strategy around earnings announcements that seeks to profit from predictable reversals of fear and greed driven price development in individual stocks.
We argue that earnings announcements are logical events around which to center such a trading strategy, because they convey fundamental information about asset prices and thus have the potential to "break" irrational price development. Moreover, because of heightened information asymmetry in the period just before an earnings announcement, price development is probably particularly susceptible to excessive fear or greed. That is, if uninformed investors observe sharp price changes just before an earnings announcement, they may attribute these to the informed trading of insiders; start to excessively trade in the same direction themselves; and thus cause an overreaction. We therefore predict-in the spirit of Warren Buffett's advice-that stocks that experience sharp price changes just before an earnings announcement will experience price reversal at the time of the announcement itself. We test this prediction with a trading strategy that on the earnings announcement date takes (1) a long position in stocks that experienced extreme negative abnormal returns in the week prior, and (2) a short position in stocks that experienced extreme positive abnormal returns in the week prior. We find that, over the two day window of the earnings announcement date and the day following, both positions are highly profitable. On average, the long position earns abnormal returns of 1.49%, and the short position earns 1.20%. We furthermore show that these return reversals are about 60% larger than around non-earnings announcement dates, and thus are significantly more pronounced than short-term return reversals documented in the prior literature (e.g., Lehmann [1990] and Figelman [2007] ). We also show that our strategy (1) is profitable in 40 of the 42 years in our sample; (2) is similarly profitable in "bear" and "bull" markets; (3) and is significantly profitable for both large firms and high volume stocks. Since the year 2000-using a conservative transactions costs estimate of 70 basis points for a round trip trade-we find that our strategy generates abnormal returns of 0.76% after transaction costs, or 95% on an annualized basis. We conclude, therefore, that prices are subject to sentiment-driven price development in the period of elevated information asymmetry just before earnings announcements, and that the announcements themselves serve as a reality check on that price development.
THEORY AND BACKGROUND
The history of financial markets has countless examples of asset prices rising or falling rapidly, and then suddenly reversing. This has been true for individual securities, certain industries, and entire asset classes. Unbalanced fear or greed in financial markets most commonly manifests itself as price momentum; which according to Fama [1998] is one of the two most robust and persistent anomalies posing a challenge to the efficient market paradigm.
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While price momentum is usually argued to have its source in underreaction (Jegadeesh and Titman [1993] ), it often ultimately produces an overreaction (Lehmann [1990] , Hong and Stein [1999] , Hirschey [2003], and Figelman [2007] ). This could be an overreaction to underlying fundamentals-for example, Zarowin [1989] documents that firms with a string of good (bad) earnings news tend to become overpriced (underpriced); or it could be an overreaction to price/investor behavior-for example, the indiscriminate selling of stocks in the wake of the financial crisis in 2008. Also, the price momentum can occur over a period of months (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman [1993] ), or within a single day (e.g. Fabozzi, Ma, Chittenden, and Pace [1995] , Schulmeister [2009] ). The defining feature of unbalanced fear and greed driven price 2 The other one is post-earnings announcement drift: the tendency of stock prices to drift upward (downward) after surprisingly good (bad) earnings news. momentum, however, is the reversal that occurs afterwards. This price reversal thus offers an investment opportunity for contrarian investors, as captured in Warren Buffett's advice to "be fearful when others are greedy and greedy when others are fearful." However, timing a price reversal is very difficult, and potentially very costly, even when an investor is correct in his or her assessment of mispricing. Theoretical papers indeed demonstrate that, even when rational investors are aware of mispricing in the market and take positions to exploit it, the mispricing can persist and may, in fact, get worse (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann [1990] , and Shleifer and Vishny [1997] ).
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In this study, we argue that earnings announcements are natural candidates for the implementation of a contrarian trading strategy that seeks to exploit the reversal of fear/greed driven price momentum. First, the increase in information asymmetry preceding the earnings announcement makes it more likely that excessive sentiment affects pricing during that time.
Second, the earnings announcement, by conveying fundamental information, serves as a reality check on that sentiment, making it more likely that price reversal will occur (if there is indeed mispricing).
4 Third, the earnings announcement date is known ex ante, which makes it possible to anticipate the price reversal and thus implement a trading strategy. These last two arguments are obvious. We elaborate on the first argument below.
The anticipation of earnings announcements makes investors aware of the possibility of being taken advantage of by informed traders. Market makers, for example, protect themselves by increasing bid-ask spreads and reducing depths in the period before the earnings announcement (Lee, Mucklow and Ready [1993] ). Because there is usually very little public information about a stock in the week before an earnings announcement, large price movements are more likely attributable to the trading activities of investors with private information.
Individual investors-who tend to watch their portfolios very closely and "over" trade in them (Barber and Odean [2001 ], [2002a ], and [2002b )-are probably particularly sensitive to the increase in information asymmetry in the pre-announcement period. We propose that they, in particular, may respond to large price movements at this time by trading in the same direction, thus contributing to price momentum. Specifically, we argue that when individual investors observe a large price increase, they may infer that insiders know that the upcoming earnings announcement will reveal unexpectedly good news. Greedy to profit from this inference, the individual investor will "jump on board" and push the price up even further. Similarly, when individual investors observe a large price decrease, they may infer that insiders know that the upcoming announcement will reveal unexpectedly bad news. Fearful to suffer the corresponding losses, the individual investor will "jump ship" and push the price down even further. We argue that the resulting sentiment-driven price momentum will result in an overreaction; thus setting the stage for our contrarian trading strategy.
TRADING STRATEGY AND METHODOLOGY
We implement our strategy as follows. We first select stocks with extreme abnormal returns in the week before the earnings announcement (from day -5 to -1, relative to the announcement date reported on Compustat). We use three different benchmarks for extreme abnormal returns during this window: 5%, 10% and 15%. Note that we do not argue that all stocks in our trading strategy have experienced sentiment driven price momentum in the preannouncement window. We simply rely on the argument that, among the stocks with large price increases, there are some that experienced greed driven price momentum such that, on average, stocks with large price increases are overpriced; and vice versa. Then, on the day of the earnings announcement, we take a long position in stocks that experienced extreme negative abnormal returns, and a short position in stocks that experienced extreme positive abnormal returns. We continue to hold both positions until the next day, to capture the abnormal returns for those stocks that announce their earnings after trading hours.
We estimate buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) using, as our benchmark, the contemporaneous return from the portfolio of firms in the same size-decile. We use size-adjusted abnormal returns because firm size is often found to be a significant determinant of the profitability of trading strategies and the magnitude of anomalies. In sensitivity analyses, we also examined abnormal returns estimated relative to the market model, and to the three-factor FamaFrench [1993] model. The results from those analyses are qualitatively similar to those reported in this study.
DATA AND RESULTS
We obtain quarterly earnings announcement dates and earnings information from
Compustat, starting in the second half of 1971 and ending in 2012. We obtain volume, price and firm size information from CRSP. We focus only on common shares and eliminate all observations with missing data, as well as those securities that are traded on exchanges other than the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. Because of restrictions that brokers impose on trading low-priced stocks (e.g., inability to sell them short or buy on margin) we eliminate all stocks with prices less than $2 per share. Our total sample consists of 643,669 observations.
Trading Strategy Abnormal Returns
Exhibit 1 reports the abnormal returns from our trading strategy. The results are reported in three panels, corresponding to the three abnormal returns benchmarks we use during our screen window: 5%, 10% and 15%. The results in all three panels confirm the economic and statistical significance (p-value<0.0001 in all cases) of the profitability of our trading strategy.
For brevity, we focus our discussion on the results in panel B, where we screen for firms with abnormal returns in excess of ±10% in the week before the earnings announcement.
There are 25,226 observations (about 3.9% of the total) that experience abnormal returns below negative 10%, and 37,568 observations (about 5.8% of the total) that experience abnormal returns above positive 10%. During the (-5,-1) screen window, these stocks have average BHAR of -15.01% and 18.08%, respectively. Consistent with our argument that this reflects, on average, at least some overreaction, the stocks indeed experience very significant return reversals
In the subsequent (0,1) holding window. And so the long position in our trading strategy generates a profit of 1.49%, while the short position generates a profit of 1.20%. A weighted average between the two positions equals 1.32% which, on an annualized basis, translates into abnormal returns in excess of 160% before transaction costs. 
Trading Strategy Abnormal Returns over Time
To investigate whether our trading strategy profits are driven by just a few stellar years, we calculate the average holding window abnormal returns for each year in our sample for the stocks that experienced at least ±10% abnormal returns during the screen window (cf., Panel B in Exhibit 1). The results are reported in Exhibit 2. They show that the long and short positions are profitable in 40 and 38 years, respectively, of the 42 years in our sample period. Moreover, the weighted average of the two legs of the strategy is profitable in 40 of the 42 years.
While the preceding results suggest that the trading strategy is profitable in both bull and bear markets, we explicitly investigate its profitability as a function of market sentiment in panel A of Exhibit 3. 6 This investigation is relevant not only because many anomalies show different returns depending on market sentiment, but our study is a specific investigation of sentimentdriven price development. We find that the long position generates slightly higher profits in bull markets (1.63% versus 1.12%), but that the short position generates slightly higher profits in bear markets (1.63% versus 1.08%). A weighted average abnormal return between the long and short positions (not reported) shows that the trading strategy's profitability is actually a little bit higher in bear than in bull markets (1.40% versus 1.29%). This finding compares very favorably with the profitability of most well-known trading strategies, which earn positive returns in bull markets, but which tend to earn negative returns in bear markets.
Trading Strategy Abnormal Returns, Firm Size, and Liquidity
To address the concern that our strategy's returns might be driven by small and/or illiquid firms, we investigate the profitability of our trading strategy after partitioning the sample into size terciles and dollar-volume terciles. We do so, once again, after limiting our investigation to those stocks that experienced at least ±10% abnormal returns during the screen window.
Panel B of Exhibit 3 presents the results of our trading strategy for size terciles based on NYSE breakpoints. Small firms indeed generate the highest holding period returns, but the returns for medium and large firms are also statistically and economically significant. For example, the long position for large firms generates a profit of 1.40%, while the short position earns a profit of -0.48% over two days. Thus, Panel B shows that the trading strategy profits are not simply driven by small firms.
Panel C of Exhibit 3 presents the results of our trading strategy across dollar-volume terciles. To create these terciles, we first divided our original sample into three equal sized dollar-volume portfolios based on total dollar volume during the holding window, after which we identified stocks which experienced at least ±10% abnormal returns during the screen window.
Not surprisingly, the least liquid stocks experience the greatest return reversals during the holding window; but, once again, even for the most liquid stocks, our trading strategy is highly profitable, generating a 1.31% profit in the long, and a 0.4% profit in the short position. Thus, liquidity concerns do not prevent a profitable implementation of the trading strategy.
Trading Strategy Profitability and Transaction Costs
The consistent profitability of our trading strategy over the last four decades clearly suggests that fear and greed affects pricing in the week preceding earnings announcements. To assess implementability, however, we need to consider transaction costs. 7 We do so by focusing on the strategy's profitability since 2000. Estimates of transaction costs vary across sources. For 7 Recall that we eliminate all stocks with prices less than $2 from our analyses. Transaction costs (as well as returns) are often particularly high for small priced stocks. Those stocks, however, are not included in this study. 
Additional Robustness Tests
We discuss the results of several additional robustness tests in this section. They are not tabulated here, but are available online. First, we investigate whether our results are different from the generic, weekly return reversal patterns documented in Lehman (1990) . To this end, we estimate return reversals from implementing our trading strategy around five, equally spaced, non-earnings announcement dates in the same fiscal quarter: 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10 weeks before the actual earnings announcement. Our results show that the return reversal around the actual earnings announcement date is about 60% higher than around non-earnings announcement dates.
These differences are highly statistically, and economically significant.
Second, we document the robustness of our trading strategy returns to alternative screen and holding windows. We find that the trading strategy becomes slightly more profitable when extending the holding window up to day +5. However, we also find that further extending the holding window to day +10, decreases profitability. When we extend the screen window to start on day -7, -10 or -20, instead of on day -5, we find that the trading strategy becomes less profitable the further we extend the screen window. Finally, we shift both the screen and holding windows, by "moving" day -1 from the former to the latter. We do so to allow for the possibility that inside information leakage on the day immediately before the earnings announcement already causes return reversal at that time. The results indicate that this is the case. Using a (-5,-2) screen, and a (-1,1) holding window, significantly increases the strategy's profitability: from 1.49% to 2.36% for the long, and from 1.20% to 1.59% for the short position. 8 Moreover, based on these windows, both legs of the trading strategy are profitable in each of the last 42
years. This is a remarkable finding that first of all speaks to the statistical significance of the trading strategy's profitability, but especially speaks to its economic significance. To our knowledge, there is no anomaly or other trading strategy-including post-earnings announcement drift-that has been consistently profitable for such a long time.
CONCLUSION
This study documents that a contrarian trading strategy around earnings announcements, in stocks that experienced extreme abnormal returns in the week preceding the announcements, is highly profitable. We attribute the significant price reversal to a sentiment-driven overreaction in stock prices in the pre-announcement period. Specifically, we argue that due to heightened information asymmetry just before earnings are announced, individual investors in particular trade in the direction of observed price changes, contributing to price-momentum that ultimately results in overreaction. Then, when the earnings are announced and information asymmetry is reduced, the overreaction leads to price reversal. We find that our trading strategy generates abnormal returns of 1.3% over a two-day window, which is more than 160% on an annualized basis. After transaction costs, and since the year 2000, the annualized abnormal returns equal 95%. We also document that our trading strategy is similarly profitable in bull and bear markets, and is robust to firm size and liquidity.
EXHIBIT 1. Trading Strategy Abnormal Returns.
This exhibit reports buy-and-hold, size-adjusted abnormal returns. The screen window runs from day -5 through day -1, relative to the earnings announcement. The holding window runs from day 0 through day +1. Stocks with prices less than $2. All reported returns in this exhibit are significant at the 0.0001 level. 
EXHIBIT 2. Trading Strategy Abnormal Returns over Time
This exhibit reports buy-and-hold, size-adjusted abnormal returns by year. The stocks in this figure experienced screen window abnormal returns in excess of 10% positive/negative (cf., Panel B in Exhibit 1). Stocks with prices less than $2 are deleted.
EXHIBIT 3. Robustness of the Trading Strategy Abnormal Returns
This exhibit reports buy-and-hold, size-adjusted abnormal returns over a (0,+1) holding window relative to the earnings announcement. The stocks in this exhibit experienced screen window abnormal returns in excess of 10% positive/negative (cf., Panel B in Exhibit 1). In Panel A, we assess the robustness of the trading strategy abnormal returns to periods of bull versus bear markets. We define bear markets consistent with J.P. Morgan Asset Management. They identify the following bear markets during our sample period: January 5, 1973 -October 3, 1974 November 28, 1980 -August 12, 1982 August 25, 1987 -December 4, 1987 March 24, 2000 -October 9, 2002 and October 9, 2007 -March 9, 2009 . All other dates are bull markets. In Panel B, we assess the robustness of the trading strategy abnormal returns to firm size. Stocks are assigned, by year, to three size portfolios, where the portfolio cutoffs correspond to the 33 rd percentile and 67 th percentile of NYSE market-caps. Finally, in Panel C, we assess the robustness of the trading strategy abnormal returns to liquidity, as measured by $-trading volume. Stocks are assigned, by year, to three equal-sized $-Volume portfolios, based on total dollar volume during the holding window. Stocks with prices less than $2 are deleted. All reported returns in this exhibit are significant at the 0.0001 level, except for the -0.48% in Panel B, which is significant at the 0.003 level. 
